Page 54 - Impact: Collected Essays on Expanding Access to Justice

52
parties stipulated to the coercive nature of his statement during post-conviction proceedings .18 The federal trial court denied Mr . Noia’s habeas petition for failure to exhaust his claim through direct appeal .19 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, noting that Americans soundly condemn the “satanic conditions” under which the statement was taken when they are employed by a totalitarian regime .20 After reviewing the history of habeas corpus at length and acknowledging the need to balance this great constitutional privilege against the demands of federalism, the Supreme Court found that federal courts have the power and the duty to provide the “ultimate remedy” of habeas corpus relief when the States withhold it .21 Thus, the Court ultimately held that federal habeas jurisdiction was not defeated by procedural defaults during state court proceedings .22 As a result, habeas petitioners were granted access to federal court if they could establish that they had not deliberately bypassed state mechanisms for relief .23
With a change in administration and new appointments to the United States Supreme Court, the law governing federal habeas corpus shifted dramatically .24 Decisions during the intervening years have steadily eroded the principles that animated Fay v. Noia . In the 1991 case Coleman v. Thompson, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected Fay’s standard allowing federal habeas petitions absent deliberate bypass of state procedure, and required petitioners to demonstrate both cause and prejudice for any state procedural default .25 Five years later, Congress codified these changes in AEDPA, articulating a clear preference for efficiency and finality .
As amended by AEDPA, 28 U .S .C . § 2254 imposes several limits on a federal court’s ability to grant habeas relief to a state prisoner .26 A federal habeas corpus petition must be filed no later than one year after the challenged state conviction becomes final .27 The exhaustion and procedural default provisions of AEDPA are daunting and a navigational challenge for even experienced habeas counsel .28 A narrow gateway through these requirements exists for those who can establish a “fundamental miscarriage of justice,” but they must meet the extremely demanding standard of actual innocence .29 These cases are “rare,” and require a petitioner “to persuade the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt .”30
18 Id. at 395-96.
19 Id. at 396.
20 Id. at 396, n.2.
21 Id. at 441.
22 Id. at 438.
23 Id.
24 See michael graeTz & linda greenhouse, The burger courT and The rise of The Judicial righT 65-74 (forthcoming 2016) (Chapter 3, “Shrinking the ‘Great Writ’”) for a summary explication of these developments during the Burger Court years.
25 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 u.S. 722, 724 (1991).
26 Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 u.S. 170, 181 (2011).
27 28 u.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(A). under certain circumstances, a petitioner can file a timely petition within one year after new evidence is discovered or could have been discovered through reasonable diligence. 28 u.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1)(D).
28 While some prisoners have a right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, no petitioner has that right in federal habeas court.
29 See Schlup v. Delo, 513 u.S. 298 (1995) (showing of actual innocence can excuse procedural default); house v. Bell, 547 u.S. 518 (2006) (applying Schlup in post-AEDPA context); McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ u.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013) (actual innocence showing overcomes one-year AEDPA time bar).
30 Schlup, 513 u. S., at 329.
Impact: Collected Essays on Expanding Access to Justice